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TAMING THE WILD WEST:
ONLINE EXCESSES, REACTIONS AND
OVERREACTIONS
Catherine J. Ross*
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014). PP. 343. HARDCOVER $ 29.95.
AMY ADELE HASINOFF, SEXTING PANIC: RETHINKING CRIMINALIZATION,
PRIVACY AND CONSENT (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS 2015). PP. 222.
HARDCOVER $ 95.00. PAPERBACK $ 26.00.

In 1968, Andy Warhol famously predicted that in the future everyone would have
fifteen minutes of fame—a prediction he regarded as full of fun. Warhol did not imagine
that the meteor flash of attention would follow provocative photos texted to a trusted
recipient who would share them with others, or that the “fame” would result from being
the target of cyber harassment at the hands of a mob or obsessed individuals stalking
both online and in the tangible world.
Recently, many observers—including the two authors whose important and
provocative books are reviewed here—have referred to the world of online
communications as a “Wild West.” But the Wild West, like the Internet, means different
things to different observers. The Wild West that Danielle Citron and Amy Adele
Hasinoff point to is not the Technicolor stuff of John Ford westerns featuring handsome,
fearless Marshalls. It is the bleaker, “primal,” and lawless west of Deadwood, waiting for
the Earp brothers to impose order.1
At first glance, the two books I am reviewing here seem to come at loosely related
problems from very different vantage points. In Hate Crimes in Cyberspace,2 Citron, a
legal scholar at the University of Maryland, argues that the harms in cyberspace are more
real and widespread than many realize. In Sexting Panic,3 Hasinoff, a communications
professor at the University of Colorado-Denver, argues that sexting plays a positive role
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, and Visiting Scholar, Harvard Graduate
School of Education.
1. Alessandra Stanley, Harking to TV’s Call of the Wild, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2015, at C1.
2. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 4 (2014).
3. AMY ADELE HASINOFF, SEXTING PANIC: RETHINKING CRIMINALIZATION, PRIVACY AND CONSENT 161
(2015).
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for teenagers who elect to engage in it, and that betrayals through nonconsensual
circulation are much less common than is widely assumed. One might paraphrase
Citron’s overarching theme as “take notice!” and Hasinoff’s as “calm down.” But
common themes and some similar proposals emerge.
I will discuss each of the books and then turn to some commonalities in the
authors’ analyses of the cultural sources of the problems they explore and the reforms
they suggest.
I. CITRON
Danielle Citron’s Hate Crimes in Cyberspace has three primary goals, all of which
the author accomplishes persuasively. First, she shows the pervasiveness of digital hate
and why it matters so much. Second, she cogently captures the existing federal and state
legal regimes and demonstrates their shortcomings in responding to a growing social
problem. And then, third, she moves on to propose realistic fixes that respect the
constitutional rights of speakers and the limitations of law to transform societal ills.4
It is a testimony to Citron’s powerful marshaling of evidence that even observers
inclined to believe that online speech is not so different from speech in traditional
venues, and that the stories one hears about cyber-stalking are based on unusual
occurrences, will leave this book persuaded. Citron garners evidence from social science
data that, although incomplete, offers consistent findings. The data gain ballast from the
emotional pull of her interviews with victims (she had in-depth information about twenty
informants, three of whose stories run through the book). The reader wants to know how
their stories turned out.
Citron captures what is special about online speech: “it exacerbates the injuries
suffered.”5 It extends the life of the words in perpetuity (at least in the U.S., which lacks
laws requiring removal of certain data). It “exponentially expand[s] the audience” for
harassment and other malicious communications.6 It can “recruit strangers” to join in,
forming cyber-mobs in a competition over who can be most abusive.7 And, Citron
demonstrates, online words can bleed into real world acts of stalking, rape, and other
forms of violence, sometimes inducing strangers to commit such crimes, as in several
cases involving false allegations that women sought sexual humiliation and abuse.8
Despite the real world risks and the burdens experienced by the targets of cyberhate, Citron establishes that law enforcement officials, campus authorities, and
employers, among others, too often trivialize the harm done by cyber-hate and blame the
victims: the victims, they say, are hypersensitive, overreacting, and should pull
themselves together.9 Some of this may flow from the fact that most of the victims are
women. Police officers and prosecutors are unresponsive even when a statute appears
applicable to the offense (which is not always the case), and they often do not even know

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

CITRON, supra note 2, at 224.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
E.g., CITRON, supra note 2, at 20-21, 29, 84-85.
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the law.
Citron describes one revenge porn victim who sought help at two different police
stations and from the FBI after materials were posted on public sites and sent to her
university and employer. All of the law enforcement bureaus to which the victim turned
rejected her pleas, giving ludicrous, erroneous legal explanations of why they could not
help her (she was an adult, her boyfriend owned the photos, they had no jurisdiction over
online attacks despite a state criminal statute that expressly applied to online
harassment). The FBI, ignoring federal statutes governing cyber-stalking and the like,
“urged her to get a lawyer to sue her harassers and to buy a gun for protection.”10
The lack of responsiveness is part of a pattern of victim-blaming that resembles the
traditional criminal justice response to rape and domestic violence. Citron reports that
victims are told not to blog, to stay off the Internet, or that their “own poor judgment” in
sharing naked photos within an intimate relationship destroyed any expectation of
privacy.11
And, as with rape and domestic violence, the unwillingness of law enforcement
agencies to take cyber-hate seriously sets up a vicious cycle: victims do not report cyberharassment because they do not believe anyone will help them and because they fear that
if they press charges, the attacks will only intensify. This under-reporting, in turn,
reinforces skepticism that the problem of hate in cyberspace is as widespread or as
serious as Citron has shown it to be.
The hate speech on which Citron focuses is largely aimed at individuals rather than
taking the form of noxious group disparagement (racist or sexist rants about groups of
people), but it is often based at least in part on gender, race, or sexual orientation. The
personal nature of the postings (often including the target’s real name and identifying
information) can lead to the denial of job offers, loss of work for those who are
employed, withdrawal from social media essential to success in many endeavors in the
modern world, and loss of identity (as in the case of a woman who had to abandon a
successful blogging career, a feminist speaker who could no longer use her real name
when traveling or publicizing her talks, and several women who felt they had to
masquerade as men in order to participate safely in online forums).12
Citron takes particular note of the gender patterns and implications of cyberspace
hate: studies in the U.S., the U.K., and other countries show that women are
disproportionately the subjects of cyber-harassment. Contemporary speech in cyberspace
is full of “sexual attacks on women,”13 as Citron’s book demonstrates in disturbing
detail. She builds on this pattern by calling cyberspace “the civil rights movement’s new
frontier.”14
Chapter 4 develops this theme by comparing the current disinclination to take
seriously the claims made by victims of cyber-attacks to the struggle to convince
lawmakers, law enforcement officials, and judges that domestic violence was real
10. Id. at 47.
11. Id. at 77.
12. E.g., id. at 18, 35-39.
13. Id. at 107 (quoting Robert Scoble, Taking the Week Off, SCOBLEIZER BLOG (Mar. 26, 2007),
http://scobleizer.com/2007/03/26.
14. CITRON, supra note 2, at 23.
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violence and that sexual harassment should not be treated as business as usual. As with
those social problems, a collaborative effort is needed involving both legal change and
public education. Social movements, Citron argues, can promote social change by
condemning and delegitimizing social practices that are taken for granted today,
discrediting them to the point where even lawmakers and judges notice.15
So too, she notes approvingly, Wikipedia’s co-founder Jimmy Wales and other
tech industry leaders have called on members of the cyber community to “change what is
acceptable on-line” by moderating discussions and promoting “norms of respect” in
cyberspace.16 This concept resembles recent efforts to teach young people who observe
bullying conduct to stand up to the bullies. But, as Citron observes, many bloggers
misunderstand the bloggers’ code of conduct Wales has proposed and refuse to subscribe
to it, at least in part, because they do not comprehend that a community’s voluntary/selfinitiated moral disapprobation of noxious expression does not violate anyone’s right to
free speech.17
Citron urges us not to abandon hope of constraining noxious expression on the
web: the six chapters in Part Two of Hate Crimes in Cyberspace are devoted to “Moving
Forward.” This brings us to “the legal agenda at the heart” of Citron’s project, which
builds on the analogy to the civil rights movement for victims of domestic violence and
sexual harassment described above.18 As part of this endeavor, she analyzes the current
state of the civil and criminal law and shows how it can be used to hold speakers
accountable. She also examines the shortcomings of the existing legal framework, the
role private parties can play, and responds to free speech concerns, proposing changes
along the way.
Citron’s discussion of the interplay between potential regulation of hateful speech
in cyberspace and the First Amendment merits close attention. In Chapter 8, Citron
anticipates, outlines, and responds to assorted free speech arguments against
governmental regulation (in the forms of new statutes and enforcement efforts) of the
cyber hate crimes that are her focus. She positions herself carefully, respecting free
speech dictates and seeking to push cyber hate speech outside the elusive boundary that
marks expression to which the First Amendment offers no safe haven.
Citron has set out to “work within the framework of existing First Amendment
doctrine,” using recognized categories of unprotected speech like defamation, true
threats, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.19 She hopes to preserve and
promote the positive use of the Internet for the public dialogue essential to active
citizenship and self-governance while reining in cyber harassment and cyber stalking.
First, however, she addresses the so-called First Amendment absolutists within the
online community who oppose any regulation and those who argue that speech on the
Internet is so special that it ought to be exempted even from “legal norms” that allow
some speech to be regulated. The latter argue that cyber speech performs multiple and

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107.
CITRON, supra note 2, at 224.
Id. at 190-91.
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incomparable critical roles in promoting “work, play, and expression.”20 Citron takes the
reasonable position that “public conversation is not the only thing happening online” and
that many other “zones of conversation” that are not public fora (e.g., workplaces, cafes
and places of employment) are not “exempt[ ] from legal norms.”21 As is well known,
the EU has gone further: EU law holds that the pervasive power of cyberspace requires
more stringent regulation that other forms of communication.22
Now Citron needs to deal with the legal norms governing speech. She is at her
most powerful in identifying and clarifying the scope of the hazards in cyberspace, and
the limitations of contemporary legal structures in dealing with them. But I am not sure
that she fully recognizes the obstacles the First Amendment may pose to some of her
proposed solutions, despite the care with which she has crafted them.
Citron acknowledges that there are two (often overlapping) views of why free
speech matters—its role in democracy and its role in promoting personal autonomy—but
she largely focuses on rationales of self-governance to the exclusion of cultural and
personal development. She is right that the “cruel harassment of private individuals does
not advance public discussion,” that it is what courts call “low-value speech,” and that it
may drive its victims out of the public discourse.23 She may, however, be too cavalier in
asserting that it is okay as a matter of First Amendment jurisprudence to silence low
value speakers24 in order to protect the “expressive autonomy” of their victims.25
In its most recent consideration of what was certainly low value speech, the
Supreme Court, in Elonis v. United States (decided after Citron’s book was published),
reiterated the classic doctrine: if hateful or threatening speech does not rise to the level of
a “true threat,” a category of speech which lies outside the First Amendment’s
protection, the speaker cannot be held criminally accountable.26 Ruling on statutory
rather than constitutional grounds, the Court held that Anthony Elonis could not be
convicted of issuing true threats through Internet postings that appeared to threaten his
ex-wife based on a showing of negligence that would be sufficient in a civil case. More
was required: proof of mens rea.27
Elonis will make it more difficult to convict speakers accused of making true
threats—and, as a matter of constitutional law, that is as it should be. Like the speakers
in many of the iconic First Amendment cases, Anthony Elonis presents as an angry,
vicious man. When such people—cross-burners and other racists, Nazis, anti-abortion
zealots, misogynists, and, yes, cyber-haters too—fight for their personal freedom to
express constitutionally protected thought we hate, everyone’s freedom of expression

20. Id. at 192.
21. Id. at 191-92.
22. E.g., Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protection de Datos (AEPD), Case C131\12, 13 May 2014, unreported.
23. CITRON, supra note 2, at 195, 196.
24. Id. at 196. To be sure, Citron cites some important constitutional scholars, including Jack Balkin,
Stephen Heymann, and Cass Sunstein, for the proposition that speech that denies the full expression or
participation of others should be amenable to being silenced, but that is not the current state of the law.
25. Id. at 197.
26. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
27. Id. at 2009-10.
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rides on the correct legal resolution of their claims.28
I am not unsympathetic to Citron’s efforts to control speech that I agree is heinous,
vicious, and harmful. But I am less sanguine that statutes can be written in a way that is
clear enough to give notice, and that does not allow the government to suppress or
prosecute speech that the Constitution requires us to allow regardless of how repulsive
we find it. It is not enough to say, as Citron does, that “[p]reventing harassers from
driving people offline [or, as she has shown, out of their homes, schools, and
workplaces] would ‘advance the reasons why we protect free speech in the first place,’
even though it would inevitably chill some speech of cyber harassers.”29 First
Amendment doctrine is clear that the government cannot prefer one kind of speaker or
speech over another, or choose to protect the preferred speaker or subject of speech at the
cost of silencing the unpopular (even hated or hateful) speaker.
Other laws already on the books, on which Citron hopes to rely in taming cyber
hate, are fraught with peril. Harassment statutes, for example, have proven notoriously
difficult to craft with precision so that they provide clear notice of what expression is
barred, and do not reach too much expression that the Constitution protects. Harassment
codes are intentionally designed to be notoriously vague, in part, as Aaron Caplan has
explained, because it is impossible to anticipate every noxious act (or form of harassing
expression), leading legislators to a “value judgment—that it is better to enact a broader,
vaguer law than to allow unforeseen bad actions to go unremedied.”30 This tendency
encourages adoption of statutes that bar “annoying” behavior, which are susceptible to
being overturned by courts.31 In the first case involving a criminal cyberbullying statute
to reach the courts, New York’s highest court overturned the new law in 2014.32 The
court held that the statute as written could not “coexist comfortably with the right to free
speech” because it reached too much annoying, embarrassing speech that the First
Amendment protects.33
Similar obstacles may stand in the way of regulating the admittedly “worthless”
speech that Citron hopes to control, despite her sensitivity to First Amendment concerns.
The task she has set for herself, and for legislators and society at large, is challenging to
say the least.
Citron offers a laudable model statute designed to regulate revenge porn, which
may well withstand scrutiny because it rests on privacy, consent, and conduct
(publishing without consent). When the book was published, statutes along these lines
had already been adopted in several jurisdictions and they have proliferated since then.34
Much will likely turn on how precise the definitions in such laws prove upon usage, and
on whether restraint or abandon characterize their enforcement.
28. See Catherine J. Ross, True Threat to Free Speech Averted in Elonis v. United States: Response, Elonis
v. United States, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (June 7, 2015), http://www.gwlr.org/elonis-v-united-states.
29. CITRON, supra note 2, at 197 (quoting DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP,
RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 129 (2007)).
30. Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 792 (2013).
31. CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 162-63, 327 n.6 (2015).
32. People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d. 480 (N.Y. 2014).
33. Id. at 485.
34. CITRON, supra note 2, at 145-49, 209-12.
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Citron is on strong ground when she urges that private (non-governmental) groups,
including service providers and individuals (like parents and members of the online
community), push back against online offenses. These participants are not bound by the
First Amendment. Moreover, the Speech Clause always prefers more and better speech
as a way of driving or drowning out the worthless speech in the marketplace of ideas.
Beyond efforts to promote norms of responsibility in cyberspace, Citron urges that host
entities monitor their sites more vigorously, that users unite to protest noxious speech,
and that greater transparency in how cyberspace is governed would help. And she
advises parents to educate and monitor their children.35 None of these proposals raise
any constitutional concerns, and all hold the potential to transform cultural norms.
II. HASINOFF
Sexting is such a new phenomenon we didn’t even have a word for it until 2008—
at least that is when the word first appeared in the press. News media in Europe first
wrote of “sex-texting” in 2004 and in 2005 the same word appears in Australian
newspapers in articles about a cricket star’s indiscretions.36 Mass media in the U.S.
focused heavily on the phenomenon starting in 2008, calling it “sexting,” and associating
it with teenagers and phones.37
I first heard rumors about the phenomenon society would later label sexting in
around 2001. A fourteen-year-old girl in a New York City private school was said to
have used a computer to transmit a photo of herself mimicking sex acts with a broom to
an older boy at the same school who she was either dating or wanted to date. The boy
forwarded the photo to his friends. None of the adults I knew who talked about these
events had a way of contextualizing the girl’s initial action (how would such a young
person come up with this idea?), but their conversations were ahead of their time in
holding the (unknown) boy responsible for the shame that many heaped on the girl. I
have no idea what discipline if any the school meted out to either teenager. In the face of
gossip and scandal, the girl and her family reportedly not only left the school, but also
moved to another state (a pattern among both students who get in trouble for their speech
and those targeted by the speech of others, as my own research and Citron’s show).38
This early episode of sexting emanated from self-expression, not from a desire to
emulate famous or infamous persons whose circulation of intimate pictures had not yet
hit the newsstands. To engage in counterfactual impossibility, if I had read Amy Adele
Hasinoff’s book in 2000, I would have had a welcome, much-needed context for
interpreting these events and conversations.
Feminist media studies provide Hasinoff’s lens.39 She uses a cultural studies
approach—the main sources for her research are nonfiction mass media portrayals of
sexting and deep qualitative analysis of what those portrayals say and how they say it.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Press.

Id. at 242-48.
HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 161.
Id. at 163.
ROSS, supra note 31, at 175, 228.
Hasinoff’s is the second volume in a Feminist Media Studies series from the University of Illinois
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While she is embedded in Foucault and other postmodernist thinkers, Hasinoff’s goal
does not lie in the realm of grand theory. Rather, she seeks to bring “common sense” to a
social issue that is rife with exaggeration and overreaction. And she succeeds.
The problem of sexting could be seen as a phenomenon with a narrow scope, even
though it is increasingly common. As Hasinoff points out, mainstream culture panics
when young people sext, but it largely ignores voluntary sexting by adults unless they are
famous politicians. In Hasinoff’s hands, however, the topic of sexting is an opportunity
to explore sexuality, gender, agency, misleading data, and the marketing of crises.
Hasinoff argues that adults are deeply distrusting of, and fearful about, adolescent
girls who embrace and control their emerging sexuality. She urges us to recognize and
accept girls’ agency: the steps they take and choices they make “to negotiate with social
norms, institutions, and structures they did not create.”40 Instead, too many institutions
from mass media to schools to lawmakers assume “girls—not men and boys—need to be
controlled and managed” and promote “the pretext that girls with sexual agency will
make the choice to avoid sexual activity outside committed long-term relationships.”41
What girls need from adults, this line of thinking insists, is help in learning how to
“voluntarily refuse and consent to sex.”42 This approach escapes the common
misapprehension of Victorian sexuality only by contemplating that consent could be a
plausible response. Consent, as Hasinoff posits, is crucial to our understanding of
sexting.
The first half of the book explains what is wrong with the currently dominant
approach. Right at the beginning, Hasinoff explains how her view of agency differs from
that of many other scholars who argue that we should listen to girls’ voices. Some
studies “idealize resistance,” telling girls to “just say no,” rather than accepting girls as
informed and willing actors.43 This viewpoint informs the first two chapters of the book
in which Hasinoff argues, among other things, that consensual teen sexting should be
decriminalized (at least for the voluntary initiator and the first, intended, recipient).
Hasinoff charges that almost no one (including the American Civil Liberties
Union) is willing to challenge the viewpoint that “teenagers should not be sexting and
should have no right to do so,” witnessed in attempts to prosecute teenage sexters.44 But
Hasinoff’s own examples undermine that claim. One of her major illustrations involves
the outpouring of objections to a Vermont proposal that “originally proposed to
decriminalize some forms of sexting.”45 The sponsors of that bill were not averse to
giving teenagers a “right to sext.” The final statute is not as bad as Hasinoff would have
it. It gives teenagers a free pass for the first offense. And she acknowledges that unlike
jurisdictions that would treat sending a sexualized selfie as a violation of child
pornography laws, Vermont enacted a statute that treats sexting as a misdemeanor that
will not expose sexters to the risk of being placed on a sexual offender registry. In
contrast, other states enacted statutes that appear to threaten sexters with the possibility
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 25.
HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 26.
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of being placed on a sexual offender registry, though no court appears to have directly
addressed the constitutionality of such provisions to date.46
Hasinoff’s Chapter 2 takes on the “homogenization” and essentialism that plague
much popular and scholarly discussion of adolescents: the notions that biology
determines how teenagers think and act, and that raging hormones and emerging brain
structures legitimatize “infantilizing” teenagers.47 Hasinoff is not alone in making these
arguments, but she makes the case powerfully.
Addressing lawyers, she criticizes attorneys advocating for youth (including the
American Bar Association which has urged that underage offenders receive
rehabilitation instead of “punitive criminal sentences”) for “inadvertently” providing
fodder for withholding rights from teenagers: “if teens are incapable of making rational
decisions and understanding the consequences of their actions, then there is no basis to
grant them free speech or due process rights.”48
Advocates of children’s rights, however, have urged that civil rights and liberties
need not be premised on competency, just as adults who are not competent retain
constitutional rights. And still others who work in the juvenile justice realm have
explained that policies intended to protect children from their own vulnerabilities are not
in fact inconsistent with acknowledging and preserving rights. We can, for example,
insist that children have a right to an attorney, as required by In re Gault,49 but that,
unlike adults, minors should not be able to waive that right because they might not
understand the implications of that waiver.
Hasinoff focuses on a familiar story—blaming the victim—in Chapter 3, but here,
with a slight twist. She “identifies a shift in online safety advice from a focus on
predators and technology as the main culprits to an explicit strategy of encouraging girls
to be autonomous, independent, and responsible online.”50 Analyzing advice given to
girls (and parents), Hasinoff concludes that the “autonomy” promoted by public service
announcements and other safety campaigns has much in common with the current
woefully inadequate sex education programs offered in public schools: both identify the
problem as girls’ lack of self-esteem, even though no “conclusive evidence” supports this
approach.51 The assumption is that girls who lack self-esteem will use sex to “seek
validation” while more confident girls would be able to say “no” and avoid risks.
Hasinoff convincingly argues that a focus on the girls who sext deflects from the
real social problem: the people who abuse the trust of those who send pictures of
themselves, who Hasinoff correctly labels “harassers and privacy violators.”52 NGOs
46. In re J.P., No. 2011-G-3023, 2012 WL 1106670 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (upholding the delinquency
conviction of a thirteen-year-old girl who sent a text to another minor, but treating the question of whether such
an adjudication might expose her to the risk of being placed on the sex offender registry as “speculative”
because the trial court did not label her act as a sexual offense); In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (overturning a
statute that imposed an irrebutable presumption that a juvenile who committed a sexual offense posed a high
risk of recidivism, and must be placed on the sexual offenders registry, but not discussing the treatment of
sexting by juveniles).
47. HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 52.
48. Id. at 54.
49. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 71.
51. Id. at 72.
52. Id.
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echo mass media and legal definitions that criminalize all forms of sexting—including
voluntary and provocative but not nude pictures—by labeling “the practice as
inherently . . . abusive” and calling it “‘digital dating violence.’”53 Hasinoff sums up her
findings: “All of the PSAs I examine . . . inadvertently blame victims and assert that
adolescent sexual expression always leads to victimization.”54
The second half of the book proposes “alternative ways to think about sexting.”55
To begin with, Hasinoff urges us to think of voluntary sexting as a potentially healthy
choice in the right context, rather than a non-normative, even transgressive, act that
places the actor in harm’s way. The choice to sext and the choice not to sext, she asserts,
are both “about sexual embodiment, with various risks and benefits, which may be
reasonably and authentically chosen in some contexts.”56
In a culture rife with sexualized images of girls and women, it is, she argues, too
easy to fall into the trap of pointing to the “bad choices” girls who sext make, and
holding girls accountable for their “failure to resist” sexualization, just as victims of rape
are too often blamed for their manner of dress or being out alone late at night.57 She is
onto something. And even more so when she turns to the “politics of respectability” in
which nice upper middle class girls walk the fine line between being feminine and
innocent while lower class girls appear as “excessively sexual” in appearance or manner,
a phenomenon long witnessed in fiction and film (though the maidservant or hooker may
turn out to be highly virtuous like Richardson’s Pamela or Julia Roberts’ Pretty
Woman).58
Hasinoff’s solution is that law and norms should distinguish carefully between
private communications shared voluntarily and invasions of privacy perpetrated through
non-consensual transmission. This involves transforming social norms and rewriting
laws. Like Citron, Hasinoff advocates for an explicit consent model that would require
websites as well as individuals to obtain consent before sharing explicit photos. Legal
changes could prove necessary, she concedes, “but,” Hasinoff maintains, “the idea of
adding consent to media is most powerful as a new social norm that can help transfer
existing ideas about offline privacy to an online context.”59
Hasinoff correctly points out that observers, from school officials and prosecutors
to media pundits and even legal scholars, too often conflate voluntary sexting by the
person whose picture is being transmitted, or being an intended recipient, with
maliciously distributing the pictures beyond their intended audience without the creator’s
consent.60 She argues convincingly that the person who transmits the sext without the
creator’s consent is invading the creator’s digital and personal privacy, which can often
have serious repercussions. Consent, she insists, must be explicit.

53. Id. at 87 (quoting Stephanie Clifford, Teaching Teenagers About Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2009, at B1).
54. Id.
55. HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 99.
56. Id. at 109.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 111.
59. Id. at 143.
60. HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 140.
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Here, Hasinoff expressly builds on what she acknowledges is a controversial
model: codes and laws requiring affirmative consent for sexual contact. New York State
became the first jurisdiction to adopt a law requiring express consent to sexual contact on
college campuses in 2015.61
Whatever the drawbacks to romance and nature in such codes for sexual
relationships, the lines are clearer when we talk about sharing pictures. Can I share your
picture, yes or no? Maybe one step further, can I share it with Joe and Bob but no one
else? This places the responsibility for obtaining consent squarely on the person who
received a sext and now wants to transmit it, and sends a clear and manageable message
and instruction. It also places responsibility squarely where it belongs.
I have made a similar argument in the context of student speech rights about the
tendency of school officials to conflate senders, recipients, and those who widely
distribute sexts.62 Schools become frontline enforcers of adult moral standards when
they discover sexts on students’ phones or websites, and, as Hasinoff notes, they tend to
punish the girls who sexted but not the students who received or shared the messages and
pictures. And schools sometimes send the evidence to law enforcement officials who
initiate the dependency, delinquency, or criminal proceedings that Hasinoff correctly
tackles.
Hasinoff usefully distinguishes between sexts intentionally and voluntarily created
by the person featured in them, and those “egregious” cases in which the subject never
consented to the activity or to having it captured in digital images, as when sexual
assaults and rapes are recorded and uploaded.63 Hasinoff does not discuss the most
famous incident in the latter category—the Steubenville rape, which finally led to an
inquiry and begrudging penalties. Instead, she uses an example of shame and humiliation
in which law enforcement officials refused to act until the victim was “reportedly driven”
to suicide.64 Hasinoff is wise to choose her words carefully, because, as Emily Bazelon
has demonstrated, on closer examination teenage suicides attributed to bullying always
require a more nuanced evaluation of factors: “The causes of suicide are almost always
complex, and preventing it requires much more than preventing bullying.”65 The “red
flag,” Bazelon reminds us, “is almost always depression.”66
Hasinoff never asks another important question: does the school have any authority
to investigate—much less punish—expression created and largely kept off campus?
Generally, I have argued the school does not have such jurisdiction unless the photos are
widely shared on campus and threaten to cause substantial disruption of the educational
process.67
Sexting Panic urges that legal bright lines for determining capacity to consent are
inappropriate and that “relativistic models of agency” determined on a case-by-case basis

61. Ch. 76, 2015 N.Y. Sess. Laws 589 (McKinney).
62. ROSS, supra note 31, at 239-41.
63. HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 141.
64. Id.
65. EMILY BAZELON, STICKS AND STONES: DEFEATING THE CULTURE OF BULLYING AND REDISCOVERING
THE POWER OF CHARACTER AND EMPATHY 109 (2013).
66. Id.
67. ROSS, supra note 31, at 239-42.
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are more suited to this terrain.68 She joins a growing group of legal scholars who are
pointing to a disconnect between generally applicable principles (such as that many
fifteen-year-olds are not developmentally mature enough to form a particular intent or
choose a particular course of action) and the application of a given principle to a specific
case or controversy (this fifteen-year-old, however, is mature enough to understand the
thing that is at stake).69 I agree so far as that goes.
But Hasinoff also argues that enabling (and requiring) teenage sexters to give
consent before others transmit their photos will change the balance of power between the
young and their parents—and that this transformation would be a positive development.
She is, of course, correct that some sexters (and intended recipients) end up in court
when parents discover photos and turn them over to the police, sometimes because they
are outraged by their child’s choice of sexual partners.70 This line of argument furthers
her discussion of what she calls hetero-normative control over adolescents.
In the process, Hasinoff overlooks the crucial distinction between parents and state
actors. Parents have constitutionally recognized liberty interests in inculcating their
children with their own values and may discipline their offspring until the age of
majority or emancipation, as long as they do not cross the legal line to child abuse. Most
of us would prefer that parents would use their own means of discipline—even if we
disagree with the ends or the means—rather than turn their children over to the state’s
coercive power, but some parents do just that in family and juvenile court every day over
all sorts of disciplinary issues, including staying out too late, disrespecting authority, and
acting out.
Hasinoff’s primary sources are drawn from mass culture, but she displays an
impressive command of the legal literature on privacy and the handful of litigated cases
involving sexting. Because her aims are practical, she discusses the inadequacy of
existing legal regimes to respond appropriately to sexting by teenagers (or adults), and,
like Citron, proposes realistic reforms. The book should be of interest to lawyers, legal
academics, and those engaged with young people and public policy.
III. COMMONALITIES
Hasinoff and Citron each refute the notion that the Internet must remain an
untamable Wild West—immune to both law and civilized social norms. As feminist
scholars who support agency for women and girls, both authors argue that women have a
right to sexual expression without fear of moral or legal repercussions (such as revenge
porn or slut shaming), much less prosecution for violating laws aimed at exploitative
pornography. While both authors argue for and propose legal changes more adequate to
these modern harms, ultimately both rely even more on proposals for cultural
transformation.
Both authors look to greater self-policing by the technology industry. Hasinoff, for

68. HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 144.
69. David L. Faigman, The Supreme Court’s Confused Empirical Jurisprudence, 15 EXPERT EVIDENCE
REP. (BNA) NO. 13, at 303 (July 6, 2015); David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group
to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014).
70. HASINOFF, supra note 3, at 150.
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example, urges a “carefully designed notice-and-takedown system for privacy
violations,”71 so long as it respects constitutional norms that aim to prevent the same
non-consensual proliferation of personal, intimate images and detail that Citron’s
revenge porn statutes target. And, in the spring of 2015, a spate of host services banned
non-consensual posting of nude pictures.72
As for legal change, both authors look to statutory reform and underscore that law
enforcement officials (including police officers, prosecutors, and even judges) need to
use their considerable discretion more appropriately and to develop more nuanced
understanding of the behaviors presented to them. In Citron’s case, this would militate
toward treating cyber offenses more seriously, while in Hasinoff’s, it would diminish the
risk that teenagers would be prosecuted for voluntary sexting.
So too, both Citron and Hasinoff recognize the limits of law and technological
fixes. They believe that as a society we could do a much better job of teaching and
informally enforcing more cautious behavior through social disapproval. Both argue that
legal change must be accompanied by social change, and vice versa. Hasinoff notes that
legal and technological solutions can only do so much: “they can be truly effective only
as part of larger efforts and cultural shifts.”73 Citron, similarly, argues that “legal reform
won’t come to fruition immediately and because law is a blunt instrument, changing
social norms requires the help of online users, Internet companies, parents, and
schools.”74 “We must,” she continues, “finish this work together.”75
There is something in the air—a confluence of concern about the online expression
that sets anonymous mobs against women and turns even the willing girl who sexts into
a victim, and about real world sexual assaults on college campuses. Perhaps both
domains (physical and online) could join in combatting cultural norms that permit or
encourage such hostility to women and to expressions of sexuality. To this end we might
draw from developments in the public health approach to preventing sexual violence.
Several principles emerged from a controlled study recently reported in The New
England Journal of Medicine that are consistent with the approaches manifest in the
work of Citron and Hasinoff. First, neither the blame nor the onus for prevention should
be placed on the victim. Second, primary prevention focused on “potential perpetrators”
(of sexual violence, online hate, indiscriminate circulation of private pictures) must be
part of a “comprehensive, multilevel approach.”76 Third, comprehensive education must
start at a younger age than when students first arrive at college. Fourth, a “socialecologic model” suggests that we must look at (and presumably transform) not just the
individuals who may become perpetrators, but “the context of relationships,
communities, and the larger society.”77 This last approach requires active participation
of bystanders in rejecting violations of positive norms (as with the online citizens who

71. Id. at 152.
72. ROSS, supra note 31, at 242, 339 n.104 (Google and Reddit).
73. Id.
74. CITRON, supra note 2, at 254.
75. Id. at 255.
76. Kathleen C. Basile, A Comprehensive Approach to Sexual Violence Prevention, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2350, 2351 (2015).
77. Id.
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shout down antisocial posts) and models of respect and healthy interaction. Even with all
of these in place, the author cautions, “[t]here are no easy solutions.”78

78. Id.

